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2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The last thirty years have witnessed major developments in the technological sector.  These 
developments have paved the way for the emergence of exciting new technologies and algorithm-
based software such as autonomous vehicles,2 automated stock traders,3 and autonomous 
weapons.4  Scholars and researchers around the globe are now debating topics such as the Internet 
of Things, smart cities, data privacy and algorithms ethics.  Moreover, software is now capable of 
reading large amounts of data sets and, consequently, is being utilized in arguably all facets of 
human life; including, but not limited to, health sciences, diagnosis methods, financial analysis 
systems, military features and connected cities.5 
How will these same scholars and researchers now respond to such developments as it 
relates to intellectual property law?  Currently, our intellectual property laws protect inventions 
within the frameworks of copyrights, patents, and trademarks. Software can be protected under a 
copyright regime or by filing a patent; depending on the specification of the computer program 
and its industrial applications. Therefore, the broader purpose of this article is to dive into the 
patent protection system and its most critical institute: disclosure.  Disclosure will play a pivotal 
role in the answer to this article’s main question: what should be done within the patent system to 
assimilate this new technologically-advanced environment?   
 
                                                     
2 See generally 2019 Autonomous Vehicles Readiness Index, KPMG INTERNATIONAL, 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2019/02/2019-autonomous-vehicles-readiness-index.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2019). 
3 Jay Somaney, Is Our Stock Market Rigged?, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2015, 1:03PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaysomaney/2015/08/24/is-our-stock-market-rigged/#76f9bfc347ca. 
4 Ingvild Bode & Hendrik Huelss, Autonomous weapons systems and changing norms in international relations, 
44 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 393–413 (2018). 
5 See generally Martin Dodge & Rob Kitchin, Code, space and everyday life, CASA WORKING PAPER SERIES 81, 
http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/working_papers/paper81.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
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A. OUR ROADMAP 
 This article intends to first provide a practical assessment regarding the normative basis of 
the disclosure requirement in the patent system, and to then propose a new dialogue with the 
software market and day-to-day practice.  By no means does this article aim to provide a solution 
for such an evolving topic, nor it does pretend to deeply discuss a broader reform of the whole 
system.  Instead, the main goal of this article is to analyze disclosure, propose improvements to 
the current system and to simulate how a facilitated view of software patentability can positively 
impact and eventually address some of the challenges posed by innovation. 
 To achieve the above-mentioned goal, this article is divided into five main sections. Section 
II will investigate the economic basis of the patent system and explore how disclosure affects this 
understanding.  To do so, this article will articulate natural rights and ethical reward-related 
theories as the foundations of the patent system.  
Section III will focus on disclosure.  As such, it will reconstruct the concept of the institute, 
analyze the justification theories behind the disclosure requirement, describe three typical cases in 
which the grant a of patent will be denied due to lack of disclosure (classical insufficiency, 
excessive of breadth and ambiguity) and, finally, show how these theories aim to promote societal  
welfare.  
Section IV will present, debate and connect five strategies presented by Jeanne Fromer,6 
Jay Kesan,7 and Samuel C. Adams8 that could potentially enhance the current disclosure system.  
                                                     
6 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, IOWA L. REV. (2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116020 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).   
7 Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 763, 763-797 (2002), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=305999 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.305999. 
8 Samuel C. Adams, Law and Economics of Software Patent Disclosure, THE MUNICH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CENTER (2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1415722 (last visited Nov. 10 2019). 
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4 
Taking into account that these lecturers did not present their theories combined, the purpose of the 
third section is also to demonstrate how these improvements can be jointly implemented and why 
it is unlikely that these measures would increase patent grant costs, create unnecessary bureaucracy 
or demotivate users of the patent system.   
Section V intends to examine both the current landscape of software patentability and the 
circumstances in which software is eligible to benefit from the patent monopoly.  
Section VI will propose a dialogue between the social benefits inherent to an optimized 
disclosure process and the challenges that sophisticated software create; suggesting a new vision 
for the patentability of software as a policy strategy to accelerate development.  To do so, a critical 
analysis of autonomous vehicle algorithm-based software will be applied under the disclosure of 
rational benefits, suggesting that copyright protection might undervalue  the benefits of disclosure. 
 This article will then apply commentators and cases from the US and Europe,9 taking into 
account that these are major jurisdictions and precursors of the current patent system.  While it is 
important to acknowledge that these two systems hold different views of software patentability, 
the concepts and assumptions made in this study are likely to apply to any patent system grounded 
on the social bargain of monopolistic protection to the inventor and disclosure of knowledge to 
society. 
We will begin by clarifying exactly what this phrase “patent system” means for the 
purposes of this study. 
 
                                                     
9 Patents,  WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS, 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2017-chapter2.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (articulating 
that during 2016, the Europe Patent Office and the United Patent Office estimated that they accumulatively 
received 24% of the total amount of patents application in the world). 
4https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss1/1
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II. THE PATENT SYSTEM  
A. SOCIAL BARGAINING SCHEME 
The patent system is a social bargaining scheme developed to motivate individuals and to 
create, innovate and disclose such creation for the whole of society.10  In return for such disclosure, 
inventors will receive a monopolistic protection of their invention for twenty years.  In other words, 
if someone discloses an invention under a patent regime, no one else will be able to economically 
explore the invention because the inventor possesses a monopoly over it.11 
Influenced by this scenario, our defined patent system carries an expectation of achieving 
the right balance between both the social benefits of invention disclosure and the monopolistic 
incentive granted to the inventors.12  The growing number of patents being litigated is a signal that 
the system presents concerns for inventors that need to be better understood  to be fully 
addressed.13  
B. EMERGING COMPUTER TECHNOLOGIES 
One of the sectors most impacted by the growing number of patent litigation cases is 
computer technologies. This raises the issue of whether or not the rate of innovation is increasing 
or decreasing as a result of deficiencies in the system.  In other words, the centenary patent system 
is under close examination by its relevant stakeholders (e.g., policy makers, inventors, patent 
lawyers, intellectual property professors) who are now trying to understand if the above-mentioned 
balance is still accurate.  After all, the aim of these stakeholders is to understand how this social 
                                                     
10 LIONEL BENTLY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 393 (5th ed. 2018). 
11 Id. 
12 An Overview of Patent Litigation Systems Across Multiple Jurisdictions, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INDICATORS, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2018-chapter1.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 
2019). 
13 Id. 
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bargain (which is inherent to the patent system) can effectively contribute to the progression of the 
software industry.14 
C. ECONOMIC BASIS  
The patent system relies, on one side, on the contribution provided to society when an 
invention is published.  On the other side, it relies on incentives (e.g., a monopoly for twenty years) 
granted to the patentee who has submitted a patent application and disclosed how he or she has 
conceived the invention.  In 1950, Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose15 explained four main types 
of arguments that justify the creation of patent rights.  Each argument is equally valid today.  
Argument type one:  
“A man has natural property right in his own ideas. (…) Hence enforcement of 
exclusivity in the use of a patented invention is the only appropriate way for society 
to recognize this property right.”16  
Argument type two:  
“Justice requires that a man receive, and therefore that society secure to him, reward 
for his services in proportion as these services are useful to society.  Inventors 
render useful services.”17  
 
 
                                                     
14 Patents,  WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS, 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2017-chapter2.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) 
(articulating that Computer Technology patent applications account for 7.4% of all the applications published 
worldwide). 
15 See generally Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 THE 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 1, 1-29 (1950). 
16 Id. at 10. 
17 Id. at 10. 
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Argument type three:  
“Industrial progress is desirable to society.  Inventions and their exploitation are 
necessary to secure industrial progress.”18  
Argument type four:  
“Industrial progress is desirable to society.  To secure it at a sustained rate it is 
necessary that new inventions become generally known as parts of the technology 
of society.  In the absence of protection against immediate imitation of novel 
technological ideas, an inventor will keep his invention secret.”19 
Within the context of these four arguments, Samuel C. Adams20 articulates four accepted 
justifications of the economic basis of patent systems.  Two are connected with ethical 
considerations and the other two are connected with property rights. 
The first justification is based on the natural rights of individuals.21  It arose from French 
patent law and sustains that, just like tangible property, patent rights (a.k.a. intangible property) 
shall be protected as long as the property is a result of the labor of an individual.22  While this 
theory does not require further justification, since it is based in natural rights principle,23 an 
important characteristic of the patent system is the fact that patent rights are non-rivalrous and 
non-excludable; this in contrast to tangible property rights which are rivalrous and excludable.24  
                                                     
18 Id. at 10. 
19 Id. at 10. 
20 See Adams at 1-6. 
21 Id. at 2. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  
24 Alan J. Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23.2 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 401, 413 
(Spring 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1490722 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
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In applying this first theory, we note a setback.  Had Leonardo Da Vinci described how to 
build a parachute in the fifteenth century in a regular and accessible language, anyone could have 
used those specifications and drawings (i.e.,the intangible property) that he drafted and disclosed, 
and perhaps built their own parachute.  Consequently, once someone is using the parachute (i.e., 
the tangible property), that very same asset cannot be used by another individual at the same time.25  
This application of the first theory fails to provide empirical proof of ownership and, consequently, 
does not provide a social welfare in exchange for the right of exploitation of an idea.  
This gap leads to the second explanation of the economic basis of the patent system: the 
utilitarian approach.26  The utilitarian-oriented explanation of the patent system provides that a 
resource should be employed as efficiently as possible.27  This would allow the inventor to take 
advantage of the creation.28  This analysis is questionable, because it portends that there is no use 
in a patent if the invention happens without incentive.  While this assessment might sound 
attractive, the reality and limitation of this approach is that it relies on the fact that disclosure poses 
an incredible value, not only in the speed in which innovation can reach the market, but also in 
further innovation that can be spawned from the invention.  In other words, if the patentee does 
not have incentive to patent an invention, it is possible to affirm that a group of inventions would 
never come out and perhaps no one would benefit from that knowledge.  
Adams’ final method to assess the economic basis is through the lens of ethical rewards.30  
Whereas the inventor should receive an award to the extent that he or she provides a valuable 
                                                     
25 Parachute, THE BRITISH LIBRARY, http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/features/leonardo/parachute.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2019). 
26 Adams at 3. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
30 Id. at 4. 
8https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss1/1
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contribution to society’s general knowledge, the risk of this theory is that the system grants 
incentive for inventions that should not be eligible for this protection.31  This theory acknowledges 
that both tangible and intangible properties hold certain singularities that the inventor should be 
awarded at the same time. In essence, it presents an inconsistency between the reward to the 
inventor and the effective contribution. 
 
III. DISCLOSURE: A FOUNDATION FOR THE PATENT SYSTEM SOCIAL BARGAIN 
Disclosure is a fundamental step in the patent system.  To achieve the social value desired 
by society, the inventor must  disclose their knowledge.  This increases the likelihood that everyone 
can benefit from their achievements.   
According to Bently, Sherman, Gangjee & Johnson’s research published in Intellectual 
Property Law: “In particular it is said that patent act as incentive to individuals or organizations to 
disclose information that might otherwise have remained secret. Patent also encourages 
information to be disclosed in a way that is practically useful.”32  This practical use is a pivotal 
component of the patent system and completely connects with both Adams’ justifications as well 
as the social benefits of disclosure.   
Although this concept of “benefits of disclosure” is self-sustained, it is of fundamental 
importance to point out a divergent opinion regarding the role of disclosure in the patent system.  
While most scholars sustain that disclosure should be the central element of the system, Alan 
                                                     
31 Id. 
32 BENTLY ET AL. at 397-398. 
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10 
Devlin, an American lecturer, believes that there is a misconception in the role of disclosure within 
patent system.33  
According to Devlin, disclosure will only have value for an invention that is not self-
revealing; otherwise, there is no benefit for the society.34  An invention that is self-revealing allows 
another to reverse engineer it and obtain enabling knowledge when the invention enters the 
market.35  In his own words:  
“The disclosure requirements of § 11236 disincentivize patentability in inverse proportion 
to the self-revealing quality of the relevant invention (...) the prospect of a twenty years 
monopoly over an invention that others could otherwise readily appropriate will greatly 
exceed that cost in a monopoly.”37  
 
Devlin goes further and sustains that disclosure should be treated as an ancillary feature.  
He argues that, in reality, disclosure may often be in conflict with the incentive to invent.  
Therefore, it is a mistake to treat incentive and disclosure goals with the same level of 
importance.38  The author reaches this conclusion by analyzing conflicts within the patent system.  
One of these conflicts occurs when  innovators try to expand the scope of protection by applying 
broad language in patent claims.39  Additionally, the Patent Office might overlook these claims, 
                                                     
33 Devlin at 418. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 United States Patent Act §112: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and 
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. 
37 Devlin at 419. 
38 Id. at 404. 
39 Id. at 410-412. 
10https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss1/1
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granting the patent and creating a disproportionate cost for society; which will now bear the 
disadvantages of a low-quality patent.40 
While nobody would cast doubt regarding the assertion made by Devlin about the rising 
number of broad and poor patents, the reality is that the solution to this problem will not involve 
deferring an ancillary role to the disclosure requirement.  The solution for broad and poor patents 
should, instead, go in the opposite direction of giving an ancillary role to the disclosure 
requirements.  This solution encompasses further development of the Patent Offices and grants 
additional resources for these officers to better assess the patent application process.  These 
proposed improvements will play a beneficial role in the assurance of the notice function of the 
patent system.  
Because patent offices and courts devote significant resources to explain the standards of 
disclosure, the following subsection will assess the required qualifications of sufficiency of 
disclosure within a patent system and introduce important cases connected to the topic. 
A. A DEFINITION OF EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE UNDER THE SUFFICIENCY CRITERIA 
A fundamental part of the social bargain contract involves investigating the basis of 
disclosure.  Such an investigation will be of paramount importance to understanding what 
sufficient disclosure accounts for and how such a concept is applied by courts and patent offices. 
Article 83 of the European Patent Convention provides that: “the application shall disclose 
the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled 
in the art.”41  
                                                     
40 Id. at 404. 
41 Article 83 – Disclosure of the invention, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/epc/2016/e/ar83.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
11Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
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As we can infer from the text, this disclosure narrows the range of protections of certain 
patents.  The underlying reason for this rests on the fact that the system assumes that, when 
patentees disclose their invention, they are sharing their knowledge.  Additionally, they are 
allowing other researchers to build upon the invention, learn and make additional inventions that 
will be beneficial to the society.  
Concomitantly, these same patentees take advantage of the prior art and knowledge that 
had been previously disclosed.  For this reason, the concept of a person skilled in the art is an 
important part of the construction of the limits of the disclosure and the patent protection.  This is 
what separates the obvious from the non-obvious42 or; in other words, this is what is going to 
isolate the real contribution of the invention for the scientific community.  
Bently, Sherman, Gangjee & Johnson clarify that it “does not matter if the invention arose 
as a result of years of research by a team of leading experts, by chance, or by an unskilled person.  
All that matters is whether the person skilled in the art would consider the invention to be non-
obvious.”43 
Indeed, as articulated by the European Patent Office Technical Board, the identification of 
a skilled person requires careful consideration.44  According to the Technical Board Decision: 
“The skilled person will be an expert in a technical field.  If the technical problem is concerned 
with a computer implementation of a business, actuarial or accountancy system, the skilled person 
                                                     
42 According to the European Patent Convention, in its Article 56: “An invention shall be considered as involving an 
inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. If the state of 
the art also includes documents within the meaning of Article 54, paragraph 3, these documents shall not be 
considered in deciding whether there has been an inventive step.”  Article 56 – Inventive step, EUROPEAN PATENT 
OFFICE,  https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2016/e/ar56.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
43 BENTLY ET AL. at 582. 
44 See Decision of Technical Board of Appeal (Sept. 26, 2002), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-
appeals/pdf/t000641ep1.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).   
12https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss1/1
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will be someone skilled in data processing, and not merely a businessman, actuary or 
accountant.”45   
For this reason, as it relates to the perspective of a person skilled in the art, there are three 
major instances in which a patent application can be invalidated or rejected due to insufficient 
disclosure.  These instances can occur either during the patent examination by the patent office or 
even after a patent was granted. 
The first instance of disclosure insufficiency is classical insufficiency.46  Such a situation 
was assessed in a UK case, Mentor Corporation v. Hollister Incorporated, where the court 
analyzed the meaning of “person skilled in the art” as it relates to patent claims. 47 Justice Lloyd 
L.J. reasoned:  
“Further, we are of the opinion that it is not only inventive steps that cannot be required of 
the addressee.  While the addressee must be taken as a person with a will to make the 
instructions work, he is not to be called upon to make a prolonged study of matters which 
present some initial difficulty: and, in particular, if there are actual errors in the 
specification-if the apparatus really will not work without departing from what is 
described-then, unless both the existence of the error and the way to correct it can quickly 
be discovered by an addressee of the degree of skill and knowledge which we envisage, 
the description is insufficient.”48  
 
Due to classical insufficiency, a patent application will not be granted or an issued patent 
may be invalidated if the disclosure was not properly made in the claim.  Consequently, a person 
skilled in the art cannot work on a claim and reach a similar result.  
Bently, Sherman, Gangjee & Johnson provide some useful insights as to what would 
qualify as an insufficient disclosure.49  They argue that a person skilled in the art does not need to 
                                                     
45 Id. at 9. 
46 BENTLY ET AL. at 602. 
47 Mentor Corp. v. Hollister Inc. (1993) R.P.C. 7 (Eng.) 
48 Id. at 13. 
49 BENTLY ET AL. at 602-603. 
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use any inventive step to achieve the same result of the patent.50  Instead, based on common general 
knowledge, this person shall be entitled to rebuild the invention by applying the information 
disclosed in the application.51  Likewise, if the person skilled in the art cannot rebuild the 
invention, the disclosure was not done in a manner that allowed the sharing of new knowledge.52  
Accordingly, the patent will be invalid or the application will not be granted due to insufficient 
disclosure.  Moreover, the person skilled in the art shall not be required to incur an unreasonable 
burden to reconstruct the invention.  In case that occurs, it also means that the invention was not 
completely disclosed; hence, a patent application will not be granted or an issued patent should be 
invalidated.53  Because the patent holder enjoys twenty years of monopoly protection, the system 
wisely portends that society should not incur a cost to recreate innovation. 
In the 2006 UK case Halliburton Energy v. Smith International,54 the court of appeal of 
England and Wales heard an appeal related to software.  Lord Jacob wrote the ruling that was 
unanimously followed by the court.  On one side, Halliburton claimed that Smith International 
created software by applying some concepts that, under Halliburton´s opinion, infringed two 
patents of a cone drill used in the oil extraction industry.  Smith International counterclaimed, 
arguing the patent granted to Halliburton should be revoked.  At the trial court, Sir Pumfrey J. 
ruled that, even though part of Smith’s invention would infringe the scope of Halliburton´s patents, 
                                                     
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Halliburton Energy Services Inc. v. Smith International (North Sea) Ltd. & Ors., [2006] EWCA Civ 1715 (Eng.), 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1715.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
54 Id. 
14https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss1/1
 CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW  
 
 
15 
these patents should be invalidated on the basis that they were not sufficiently disclosed for a 
person skilled in the art.55  
Lord Jacob provided a very thoughtful insight as to what constitutes a sufficient disclosure.  
In his own words:  
“A patent is supposed to teach people how to perform the invention. If necessary, 
information is not actually in the patent, then the skilled person must be given a clear 
unambiguous direction of where to get it.  He cannot be expected to find such a direction 
buried in acknowledgements of the prior art.  Ultimately the question is one of construction 
– does the patent clearly teach the skilled addressee how to perform the invention?”56 
 
This specific paragraph is of tremendous value to this study.  It summarizes how the social contract 
bargain shall be performed by the patentee.  If the patent disclosure does not reach the goal of 
teaching the person skilled in the art due to a lack of essential information, no monopolistic 
protection should be granted. 
This case is relevant for several reasons.  First, it assesses the discussion of reference to 
other documents.  It also advances the concept that a person skilled in the art may not be an 
individual.  Still, for the purposes of this article, the idea is to assess how the court had reached the 
conclusion that the invention was not properly disclosed, as an example of classical insufficiency. 
The second instance of disclosure insufficiency deals with “insufficiency due to excess of 
breadth.”57  It is sometimes referred to as “the Biogen Test,” as a result of Lord Hoffmann’s ruling 
in Biogen v. Medeva.58  This insufficiency due to excess of breadth occurs in incomplete patent 
applications that account for large sets of hypotheses.  It happens when the patentee does not 
                                                     
55 Id. 
56 Id. at Item 67. 
57 BENTLY ET AL. at 603. 
58 Biogen Inc. v. Medeva PLC, [1996] U.K.H.L. 18 (Eng.), https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1996/18.html 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
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disclose comprehensive information that would allow the person skilled in the art to use the entire 
claimed invention.  Consequently, part of the social benefit of sharing know-how is simply 
nonexistent.  Accordingly, no monopoly should be granted to the inventor.  In such a scenario, the 
courts had widely accepted the plausibility test, which suggests that a patent with a general and 
large claim should be withheld if there is a reasonable possibility that the invention would work in 
all compounds.59  
Even though this approach sounds attractive, one downside is it creates a monopoly reward 
that, if granted, will create an imbalance in the benefit generated to the society; i.e., it becomes 
possible to speculate that the inventor will earn a monopoly in a compound that has some chance 
of failure.  Such failure will likely account for a decrease in the level of investment in research on 
that specific compound; first, because there is a low likelihood of return over the investment and 
second, because there are high chances of violating a patent and facing an expensive patent 
litigation.  Consequently, society will not experience any benefit from such a situation.  
As mentioned above, a credible guideline of insufficiency due to excess of breadth can be 
found in the decision issued by the United Kingdom House of Lords in 1996, Biogen v. Medeva.60  
In this case, Lord Hoffmann first conceptualized what is currently known as the Biogen Test. In 
1978, Biogen filed a patent with the United Kingdom Patent Office claiming the company 
developed technology which allowed an artificial reconstruction of a genetic code embodied in a 
DNA molecule that, once introduced in the host cell, could make antigens of the virus hepatitis.61  
Such a patent would be used as a basis to obtain a priority date for a subsequent application that 
                                                     
59 BENTLY ET AL. at 604. 
60 Biogen Inc. v. Medeva PLC, [1996] U.K.H.L. 18 (Eng.), https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1996/18.html 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
61 Id. at Section 11. 
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was filed in the European Patent Office.  Nevertheless, in 1992, Biogen decided to file a patent 
infringement suit against Medeva, which was proposing to market what was described as a third-
generation hepatitis B vaccine, made by recombination DNA technology in colonies of 
mammalian cells.62  Naturally, Medeva counterclaimed that Biogen´s patent was invalid under 
(among other reasons) the assumption that the description in the specification was insufficient 
according to section 72(l)(c) of UK Patent Act.63  
This case has various important lessons;  however, for the purposes of this article, the most 
relevant lesson becomes how the court interpreted the concept of broad patents.  This arrives in 
the ruling drafted by Lord Hoffmann: 
“If the invention discloses a principle capable of general application, the claims may be in 
correspondingly general terms. The patentee need not show that he has proved its 
application in every individual instance.  On the other hand, if the claims include a number 
of discrete methods or products, the patentee must enable the invention to be performed in 
respect of each of them.”64  
 
Finally, the third instance of disclosure insufficiency arises when the disclosure is 
ambiguous.65 In Unwired Planet International  Limited v. Huawei Technologies, Justice Birrs 
suggests that insufficiency due to ambiguity will take place when the disclosure is infeasible for a 
person skilled in the art to learn and reconstruct the invention.66   Justice Birrs explained,  “As I 
                                                     
62 Id. at Section 12. 
63 See, UK Patent Act. Article 72,1,C: “Subject to the following provisions of this Act, the court or the comptroller 
may by order revoke a patent for an invention on the application of any person (including the proprietor of the 
patent) on (but only on) any of the following grounds, that is to say: (..) (c) the specification of the patent does not 
disclose the invention clearly enough and completely enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the 
art...” 
64 Biogen at Section 63. 
65 Unwired Planet International Ltd. v Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd & Ors [2016] E.W.H.C. 576 at Section 148 
(Eng.), https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2016/576.html#para148 (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
66 Id. at Section 148-177. 
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mentioned already, if the directions in the specification are so ambiguous that the invention cannot 
be put into practice, then it is insufficient.”67   
Such ambiguity can be especially relevant when applied to patentability of algorithms, 
since there are a relevant number of algorithms that are criticized due to their lack of 
transparency.68  Bently, Sherman, Gangjee & Johnson lay out a practical distinction to determine 
ambiguity in disclosure.69  They write that: “In this context a distinction is drawn between a fuzzy 
(or unclear) claim which is a by-product of the difficult task of trying to describe an invention in 
words (which is not objectionable) and, on the other, a truly ambiguous claim (which is 
objectionable).”70  In other words, to the extent that ambiguity of the claim does not permit that a 
person skilled in the art understands whether or not they are taking the rights steps to recreate the 
invention, the patent application shall not be granted or the patent shall be invalidated on the basis 
of ambiguity in the disclosure.  
Accordingly, the European Patent Office guidelines provide a very clear instruction on how 
insufficiency due to ambiguity will be qualified:  
“What is decisive for establishing insufficiency within the meaning of Art. 83 is whether 
the parameter, in the specific case, is so ill-defined that the skilled person is not able, on 
the basis of the disclosure as a whole and using his common general knowledge to identify 
(without undue burden) the technical measures necessary to solve the problem of the 
underlying application at issue (...)”71 
 
                                                     
67 Id. at Section 156. 
68 Guidelines for Examination – Part F, Chapter III, Item 11, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/law-
practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/index.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2019). 
69 BENTLY ET AL. at 607. 
70 Id. 
71 Case law of the Boards of Appeal, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/caselaw/2016/e/clr_ii_c_7_2.htm. 
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In all three of the above-mentioned cases, sufficient disclosure played a pivotal role in 
seeking the assurance that the patentee, seeking to benefit from the incentives given by the patent, 
actually provided a meaningful contribution to the scientific community; even if that contribution 
involved nothing more than sharing knowledge. Under this assumption lies the normative basis of 
disclosure.  
However, although the patent system has made considerable improvements, the high 
volume of overly broad patents poses a threat in the system’s ability to enable the public.  Thus, 
the next section will explore policy strategies to improve the patent system disclosure function. 
 
IV. TACKLING DISCLOSURE GAPS WITHIN THE PATENT SYSTEM: SOME SUGGESTIONS  
 Despite all the efforts in the guidelines and caselaw issued by the courts, generally, patent 
lawyers, scholars and policy makers acknowledge that patent systems across the globe struggle 
with a large number of patent applications.  
As a result of this large number of patents applications, patent offices do not pay enough 
attention to effectiveness of the disclosure; i.e., they do not deeply assess the existence of prior art.  
If these two requirements are neglected, the quality of any issued patent will be lowered.  Patentees, 
on the other hand, sometime take advantage of such deficiencies and file patents which do not 
actually fulfill the requirement of proper disclosure.  These two combined elements have been 
detrimental to society and have caused a steady increase in patent litigation in recent years.72 
                                                     
72 According to a study published by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, from 2009 to 2014, the numbers of patent grants and 
patents litigation suffered a sharp increase in United States. The patent grants soared from roughly 190.000 to 
almost 290.000, and litigation increased from 2.500 to 6.500 cases. 2014 Patent Litigation Study, PwC, 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigation-study.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2019). 
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 Under these circumstances, there are five proposals which have been presented by three 
scholars that might improve the disclosure function of the patent system and increase the efficiency 
and welfare of software patentability.  The first two proposals may be applied to the patent system 
overall, whilst the others are more oriented to software patentability.  
A. STRATEGY #1: SEPARATING THE LEGAL FROM THE TECHNICAL 
Lecturer Jeanne Fromer73 suggests an amendment in the patent application document.  As 
Fromer points out, the patent application description involves a combination of legal and technical 
language within the same section of the application. Such combination may lead to a 
misconception about the patent extension.  Ultimately the audiences of these two languages are 
indeed diverse; the legal language targets patent lawyers and the technical language targets 
researchers and innovators. Therefore, once the application merges these two languages it, 
perhaps, jeopardizes the information function of the patent system without accomplishing its goal 
of sharing the knowledge.74 
To address this issue, Fromer proposes to separate the legal layer from the technical layer.75  
Accordingly, it would be of great value to ensure that the technical details are presented in a format 
that would be more appropriate for the person skilled in the art to learn and rebuild the invention; 
whilst the legal layer would be more focused to attend courts so as to rebuild the legal limits of the 
patent claim.76  Fromer further clarifies that these two layers will make it possible for the person 
                                                     
73 Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, IOWA L. REV. 564-569 (2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116020 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).    
74 Id. at 569. 
75 Id. at 569-571. 
76 Id. at 570. 
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skilled in the art to rebuild the knowledge to its full extension without undue experimentation.  
Afterward, the courts will interpret this full extension using legal analysis.77  
 Our next three suggestions to improve the disclosure function are all presented by Professor 
Jay Kesan of the University of Illinois College of Law. Kesan’s research begins by recognizing 
that patentees have little incentive to conduct a comprehensive study of prior art.78  Instead, the 
inventors are only required to disclose prior arts that are available to them.79  Consequently, the 
burden of assessing quality of the disclosure and inventive step lies in the understaffed and 
overloaded patent office.80  In addition, once the patent is issued, the legal system will grant a 
statutory presumption of validity, making it harder for someone to invalidate a patent application 
due to lack of disclosure, for example.  Focusing on how an improved disclosure function can help 
computer-implemented inventions, this article now proposes three strategies that would enhance 
the system.  
B. STRATEGY #2: AN ENHANCED PRIOR ART DISCLOSURE PROCESS 
The first relevant strategy presented by Kesan81 involves an enhanced process for prior art 
disclosure.82  He portends that the patentee should expand disclosure of prior arts.  Kesan argues 
that the patentee should include how the claim fulfills the patentability requirement of usefulness, 
novelty and technical application over prior existing art.  Therefore, only if the inventor adopts 
this path in the patent application will the patentee hold the statutory validity that is currently held 
                                                     
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 153 
79 Id. 
80 According to WIPO, innovators across the globe filled 3.3 million patents in 2018. World Intellectual Property 
Indicators: Filings for Patents, Trademarks, Industrial Designs Reach Record Heights in 2018 WIPO, 
https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2019/article_0012.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
81 Kesan at 145- 152. 
82 Id. at 155-157. 
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by any patent.  This approach is beneficial for everyone in the patent environment: society will be 
in a better position to gain knowledge from the patent application, the under-resourced patent and 
trademark offices across the globe will benefit from a reduction of the asymmetry of information 
and inventors will be less likely to have post-issuance litigation related to their patented products.83 
C. STRATEGY #3: WITHHOLDING STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY 
 Kesan presents another mechanism as an alternative to the above-mentioned suggestion.84  
He reasons that, if the patentee does not have enough incentives to elect the enhanced disclosure 
path for the patent application, the patent should not be presumed as statutorily valid.85  In other 
words, the benefit that is granted to society with an enhanced disclosure process is not the same as 
what inventors typically disclose if the burden of prior art analysis is allocated to the patent office.  
Thus, society should not have to overcome a presumption of validity (which increases social costs) 
to invalidate and/or restrict a patent that does not add much value to the scientific community. 
D. STRATEGY #4: APPLYING REPRESENTATIONAL LANGUAGES 
Kesan’s final86 strategy (as it relates to our notion of inproved disclosure) consists of the 
requirement of the use of representational languages in the specification of software patents.  
Kesan criticizes what he refers to as a “false translations problem,”87 essentially saying that patent 
applications should not advance descriptions that use different terminologies that might be relevant 
and understandable by few peers who belong to the same organization of the innovator.88  
                                                     
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 157-158. 
85 Id. 
86 While in this paper we are calling this as a last strategy, in Kesan’s paper this is his fourth strategy. 
87 Kesan at 166. 
88 Id. 
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According to him, this jeopardizes any ability that further inventors will have to understand what 
the actual prior art really is at the time of the patent application.  Such a condition has decreased 
the incentives that inventors must seek patentability of a software-implemented invention.  In other 
words, if an inventor decides to patent a software invention, the innovator will risk that their 
invention breaches another patented software with the same features.89 
E. STRATEGY #5: A DEPOSITORY MECHANISM 
In 2007, Samuel C. Adams advanced yet another suggestion.90  In his work, Adams 
comprehensively assessed intellectual property law, software, patents and disclosure through the 
lens of both legal and economic principles.91  While acknowledging that software patents are 
typically a field of incremental innovation; Adams further ascertained that the disclosure 
mechanism of the software patent market is not performing at its best.  He goes further and suggests 
that a mandatory disclosure of software source code might in fact hurt the patent system.92   
Moreover, he believes that innovators will likely keep their innovation secret because the 
disclosure of source code might increase the ability of thefts to copy the invention.93  It is in this 
scenario that he makes a relevant and, perhaps, fundamental connection that might take software 
patentability to a safe harbor.  He advocates that software patentability should employ a similar 
depository mechanism as the one currently in use in the biotechnology patents.94  
                                                     
89 Id. at 167-168. 
90 Samuel C. Adams, Law and Economics of Software Patent Disclosure, THE MUNICH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CENTER (2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1415722 (last visited Nov. 10 2019). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 39-41. 
94 Id. at 41-46. 
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 According to Adams, a depository scheme should observe three requirements.95  First, even 
though the software applicant might deposit the source when filing the application, such code will 
be unavailable until the patent is granted and published.  This balance will assure that if the patent 
is not granted for any reason, the inventor retains the ability to seek another format of protection 
(e.g., trade secret).96  Second, a request for a source code must require a digital signature.97  The 
identification of the requester would be supplied to the patent holder, assuming that this could 
increase the value of the patent by approximating technology holders to potential licensees.98  
Third, deposit would be critical to ensure standardization, security and impartiality.99 
F. SYNTHESIZING THE STRATEGIES 
After reading each strategy  it is tempting to believe that, once they are implemented to 
their full extent, they might add relevant drawbacks and bureaucracy in promoting innovation.  
Nevertheless, these strategies, if implemented in full by policy makers, will much likely go the 
opposite way.  First, the patent system will only be used by those inventors that are willing to take 
full advantage of the system, thus the incentives for an inventor to spend more resources in the 
patent disclosure are greater in comparison to the incentives of an inventor of a limited usefulness 
patent.  Second, by aligning frameworks, it will improve the transparency and subsequent trade-
off of disclosing the underlying knowledge.  Consequently, the quality of the scientific disclosures 
is likely to increase in the long-term, allowing innovators to learn what has been built and innovate 
further.  Lastly, relating back to algorithm-based software, an important strategy is to assure 
                                                     
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 42. 
97 Id. at 43. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 44. 
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connectivity among the devices.  For instance, autonomous vehicle algorithms shall interface with 
other vehicles, otherwise, potential consumers will have credible safety restrictions. To achieve 
the desired outcome, an understanding of the source code is of fundamental importance.  
In summary, although there is a credible concern that the patent system is not promoting 
the welfare that is expected,100 the combined implementation and application of these ideas can 
take the patent system closer to such a goal.  Once such a goal is achieved, software-related 
companies can be viewed in a completely different manner.  Following this pattern, the next 
section will debate the current stage of software patentability. 
 
 V. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE 
 Generally, patent systems provide that a mere scheme, rule or method for performing a 
mental act, playing a game, doing a business or a computer program, are not eligible subject matter 
for patent protection.101  Under this scenario, it would be inevitable to assume, just like Andrew 
Murray has suggested, that no further discussion should be necessary for software patentability.102  
Nevertheless, the reality presents a completely different approach.  Therefore, this section will 
explore how the patent system has evolved, how the doctrine of the technical effect and something 
more can affect this debate. 
 This discussion related to software patentability began in 1949 in the United Kingdom 
courts, when an inventor by the name of Mr. Gevers invented a data processing operation using a 
                                                     
100 ANDREW MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW 262 (Oxford, 3rd ed. 2016). 
101 Art. 52, 2 of European Patent Convention provides: “The following in particular shall not be regarded as 
inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1: (a)discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;  (b) 
aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, 
and programs for computers;  (d) presentations of information.” 
102 Murray at 262. 
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punch card to index trademarks and seek similarities.  He applied for a patent that would configure 
a manner of manufacture.103  The officer of the UK Patent and Trademark Officer held that “the 
subject matter of the invention would seem to be a 20 scheme or plan which, although it might be 
ingenious and useful, was not a patentable invention within the meaning of section 101 of the 
Act.”104  Mr. Gevers then filed a lawsuit to have his patent granted.   Justice Graham J. granted the 
appeal and deferred the patent on the basis that his invention was likely a cam control and could 
be distinguished from a typical punch card with written instructions.105  
The system evolved in 1986 when the European Patent Office board issued a decision 
which became known as the technical effect approach.106  This was a first attempt to draw the line 
of what would qualify as a computer-implemented invention subject to patent protection.107  The 
European Patent Office´s board decision provided that: 
“Generally speaking, an invention which would be patentable in accordance with 
conventional patentability criteria should not be excluded from protection by the mere fact 
that for its implementation modern technical means in the form of a computer program are 
used.  Decisive is what technical contribution the invention as defined in the claim when 
considered as a whole makes to the known art.”108 
 
In the United States of America, a similar situation happened in 1998, when the US Court 
of Appeals for the Federal District assessed the case of State Street Bank & Trust Co v. Signature 
Financial Group.109  In summary, Signature Financial Group (“Signature”) developed a 
                                                     
103 Gevers Application [1969] FSR 480. 
104 Id. 
105 Murray at 263. 
106 Vicom Systems, Inc., No. T 208/84 (EPO Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.1, July 15, 1986), 
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t840208ep1.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
107 Murray at 264. 
108 Vicom Systems, Inc. 
109 State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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proprietary system which had enabled mutual funds to pool their assets in an investment portfolio, 
under a partnership structure.  Justice Rich wrote the majority, which stated, “Unpatentable 
mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting 
disembodied concepts or truths that are not “useful.”  From a practical standpoint, this meant 
thatan algorithm must be applied in a “useful” way to be patentable.110 
Finally, another relevant case related to what makes a mathematical  algorithm patentable 
is “Alice” and “Something More.”111  This was a ruling issued by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in October of 2013.112  The case debated whether or not a method of exchanging financial 
obligations embodied in a computer system would be patentable under the United States Patent 
Act.  The ruling was unanimous; with the Court holding that the method, whilst in a new platform, 
did not change what was already known by science.  The opinion of the Court was drafted by 
Justice Thomas and provided a very pragmatic and intuitive approach on how to assess software 
patentability.  He sustained his opinion by giving examples of building blocks and something 
more.  According to his point of view, when assessing the exception provided by law, the courts 
should distinguish between these blocks and something more.  Consequently, if the patent 
disclosure is just providing coordination or integrating things that are already known to humans, 
such a patent would not qualify as invention; and therefore, should not be subject to patent 
protection.  
The reason for that interpretation is that the patent applicant had not added any relevance 
to society’s general knowledge.  Within this scope, the “Something More” doctrine consists of an 
                                                     
110 Id. 
111 Siva Tanbisetty, Alice and ‘something more’: the drift towards European patent jurisprudence, 3.3 JOURNAL OF 
THE LAW AND BIOSCIENCES, 691-696 (2016) https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/3/3/691/2548353. 
112 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349, 189 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2014). 
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understanding that, if the patentee adds relevant knowledge to the system (i.e., something more), 
then they should be awarded the monopoly of patent protection.  Justice Thomas went further, 
providing a signal to the patent market.  He wrote: “This Court has long ‘warn[ed] ... against’ 
interpreting § 101 ‘in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman's art.’’”113 
 While the technical effect and the “Something More” case briefly explained above are not 
the main topic of this paper, it is interesting to point out that both of these cases (in addition to the 
strategies presented in the prior section) are clearly aiming to create incentives to inventors to 
demonstrate the actual contributions of their invention.  After all, it is all about how an effective 
disclosure can contribute to the society learning process. 
However, this is not to defend that the disclosure is working efficiently.  We may 
acknowledge that dependence in the draftsman’s art, the high volume of abstract claims and 
perhaps the twenty years monopoly,114 altogether, may not be the best model to promote 
innovation.. 
The next section will explore the autonomous vehicles algorithm by analyzing the issues 
related to algorithms and software.  We will also look at how these issues can be addressed by 
using the patent disclosure benefits debated throughout the article.  
 
 
 
                                                     
113 Id. at 2351. 
114 While it is not the topic of this paper, it is important to mention that a twenty years patent monopoly protection is 
a long period considering that, twenty years ago, smartphones were not in the market, for example. Thus, it is 
important to debate this protection period for the contemporary world. Eventually, a rediscussion of TRIP’s 
agreements is required to acclimate patent protection to present time where innovation will not be held 
innovative for twenty years. 
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VI. PROPOSING A DIALOGUE 
The purpose of this section is to explore the dialogue between the benefits of an enhanced 
disclosure patent system and the challenges faced by algorithm-based software.  To achieve this 
goal, we will investigate algorithm-based software challenges and demonstrate how, in applying 
certain strategies, we can address these overriding challenges.  Autonomous vehicles technology 
was chosen as our model because it is most suitable for the comprehension of a non-technological 
individual.  However, this same analysis can be made by using an automated trader system or 
autonomous weapon. 
Initially, it is important to understand Andrew Tutt’s explanation of algorithms.115  
According to Tutt, algorithms are merely detailed instructions to solve a specific task.116 Software 
that utilizes artificial intelligence can read data, check for additional patterns, and learn from these 
patterns.  Such development is encoded under a complex data structure, without human 
interference.117  Once these new patterns have been incorporated into the system, the software will 
make decisions or provide information considering this new set of data.118 
We can infer from Tutt’s explanation above that software that utilizes machine-learning, is 
subject to uncertainty and lack of knowledge not only by society, but also developers.  In other 
words, it is fairly complicated to understand the software code, especially when such software 
would be harming the society as a result of its learning capabilities. 
                                                     
115 Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 84-85 (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2747994. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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Under this scenario, if the patent protection system shifts and software patentability 
becomes clearer for developers, it is possible to imagine that the disclosure requirement will 
popularize an understanding of these systems and perhaps even the machine-learning algorithm.  
Consequently, this development will allow inventors to address these risks and improve the 
system, creating a virtuous and positive cycle. 
Tesla and Uber provide great examples of opaque algorithm consequences. An algorithm 
is “opaque” if it utilizes certain types of data that some users do not realize they are providing.119  
In the case of Tesla, there are two known accidents that happened; one in May 2016 and the other 
in early 2019.120  In the first example, Tesla’s autopilot system failed to detect a trailer on the street 
and caused the death of a driver.121  In the second accident, the same software did not recognize a 
concrete barrier and crashed the car, leading to the death of another driver.  In response to the first 
accident, Tesla issued a software update; yet it did not fix the system and could not prevent the 
second death.122  
Uber, a company that employs a total autonomous system in its vehicles, faced a similar 
situationon March 18, 2018. The company’s autonomous vehicle crashed and killed Elaine 
Herzberg, a 49-year-old woman in Tempe, Arizona.123  According to Arizona’s traffic safety 
                                                     
119 The Senate’s Secret Algorithm Bill Doesn’t Actually Fight Secret Algorithms, THE VERGE, 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/5/20943634/senate-filter-bubble-transparency-act-algorithm-personalization-
targeting-bill (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).  
 
120 Sam Levin, Tesla fatal crash: ‘autopilot’ mode sped up car before driver killed, report finds, THE GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/07/tesla-fatal-crash-silicon-valley-autopilot-mode-report (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Associated Press, Uber’s self-driving SUV saw the pedestrian in fatal accident but didn’t brake, officials say, 
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/24/ubers-self-driving-suv-saw-the-pedestrian-in-fatal-accident-but-didnt-
brake-officials-say.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
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regulators, although the system had recognized Mrs. Herzberg, the system was not connected to 
the brake system and, as a result, could not prevent the collision.  
 These cases share at least three important similarities.  First, all three cases resulted in the 
death of a person. Second, they are related somehow to a failure in an opaque software.  Third, it 
was a herculean effort to determine what specifically had caused the accidents.  Likewise, a proper 
disclosure of autonomous vehicle software code—under a mature patent system regime—might 
be the most relevant strategy; one that policy makers could apply to avoid accidents, as the number 
of autonomous vehicles is no doubt likely to increase in the coming years. 
These examples also demonstrate that there is room to improve algorithm-based software, 
mainly when it comes to opaque124 algorithms capable of threatening a human’s life or their 
welfare.  Consequently, if technological developers had sufficient incentives to file for a patent of 
their algorithm-based software systems, society would reap multiple benefits.  
To begin with, inventors would be granted with a monopoly for their invention without 
risking an improper disclosure of the software source code.  This, considering that the source 
would be safely storage in a depository (strategy above); just like what happens with and biotech 
genes discovery. This benefit might avoid a situation related to the leaking of a trade secret, for 
instance.125  Second, the knowledge that would have been shared in a common language (last 
strategy above) with society would likely have accelerated further development.  Eventually new 
software would have been released and such software might have prevented deaths in the streets, 
                                                     
124 The opaque term refers to a system in which an ordinary person cannot understand why the technological system 
took a particular action. Harry Surden and Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-
Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 158. 
125 See Waymo accepts $245 million and Uber's 'regret' to settle self-driving car dispute, REUTERS, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-uber-trial/waymo-accepts-245-million-and-ubers-regret-to-settle-
self-driving-car-dispute-idUSKBN1FT2BA (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
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a disruption in the financial market or even a military disaster; taking into account capabilities of 
automated trader and autonomous weapons for example.  In exchange, the patentee would have a 
much greater protection against infringement, because the disclosure was properly done and prior 
art was clearly revealed according to the first strategy above.  Third, there is a competing rush for 
building artificially intelligent software.  This rush is putting into the market systems that have not 
yet been proven safe.  In contrast to what is happening under copyright protection system, a proper 
disclosure in the patent system would not allow unsafe systems under an exclusion criterion.  
Moreover, the investment criteria in these systems could be wisely allocated, because an enhanced 
disclosure for algorithm-based patent system would play a role in demotivating duplication of 
investments.  Finally, the connectivity of the new world would possibly be in a better position, 
taking into account that the various business players may be required to understand the underlying 
technology of the other players.  In other words, the disclosure would allow that players get 
educated in regard what features are presented by competing software.  Likewise, these systems 
would be efficiently integrated and the environment better connected. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 As a result of the fast development of technology, algorithm-based computer software has 
become an ever-increasing challenge for policy makers, lawyers and ultimately citizens.  This 
article has demonstrated that, even though the debate of enhanced disclosure is not a debate only 
related to software patentability, this field of technology certainly is one of the most-impacted by 
the disclosure illness of the patent system.  
 Above, it was presented that an understanding of the foundations and justifications of the 
patent system is of fundamental importance to solving these larger issues.  The improved just 
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reward theory is the basis on which the disclosure institute is built, thus serving as the basis in 
which lawyers and policy makers shall interpret the system.  
 This is not to say that the system is complete.  In fact, the challenges that we demonstrate 
here suggest the opposite.  New challenges posed by algorithm-based software, for example the 
autonomous vehicle, are a clear indication that the disclosure function is outperforming.  To revert 
this index, this article presented five suggestions that could be applied, without undue burden to 
society and/or inventors. 
  Whatever solution policymakers adopt, the fundamental goal should be to restore the 
balance of the social contract bargain.  To forge a successful rebalance, improvements in the 
disclosure mechanism need to be at the center of the debate. 
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